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Whitehead and liminality  
Paul Stenner  
(paul.stenner@open.ac.uk) 
Open University, UK 
Although he did not use the term, Whitehead’s philosophy of organism arguably 
provides us with a way of thinking liminality in an ontological way. This ontological 
liminality helps to make sense of the specifically anthropological account of 
liminality provided by the process anthropology of Arnold van Gennep and Victor 
Turner. Although it is crucial, this is not simply a matter of the importance 
Whitehead’s philosophy gives to the concept of process. For Whitehead, finitude, in 
its most general sense, is a species of limitation. From its partial perspective, each 
finite actual occasion implicates the whole of reality within itself such that ‘each 
event signifies the whole structure’ (Whitehead, 1922, p.26). This means that no event 
is inherently isolated. It is Whitehead’s philosophy of limitation that provides the 
basis for an ontological liminality consistent with the way that concept is understood 
within the social sciences.  
Introduction 
‘Mankind became artists in ritual.’ (Whitehead  (1926, p.21). This profound statement 
has been all but ignored. And yet, for a philosopher who considers creativity (or the 
principle of novelty, or ‘the production of novel togetherness’), to be ‘the universal of 
universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact’ (Whitehead, 1929, p.21), we should 
not ignore this suggestion that the human species became artists and did so in ritual. 
Whitehead surely intends both meanings: that our capacity for the arts arose from our 
involvement in ritual, and that we perfected ritual into something like an art form. 
Writing as a social psychologist, I find in this combined proposition an exciting 
potential for unraveling some of the implications of Whitehead’s thought for the 
social sciences, and for an inherently historical and cultural understanding of human 
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psychology. This, in turn, might open new means for integrating psychosocial science 
with natural science and the humanities. Such integration at the level of cosmology is, 
of course, Whitehead’s chief preoccupation. In his analysis of rites of passage, Arnold 
van Gennep (1909, p. 194) also points in this direction when he discovers within these 
rituals ‘a cosmic conception that relates the stages of human existence to those of 
plant and animal life and, by a sort of pre-scientific divination, joins them to the great 
rhythms of the universe’. 
Building on my applications of Whitehead’s philosophy within social psychology 
(Stenner, 2008, 2011, 2013, 2016, 2018, Stenner and Moreno, 2013, Greco and 
Stenner, 2017), this paper explores just one aspect of the problem: namely, how 
process thought provides us with a way of thinking about the liminal – a concept 
introduced by van Gennep - in an ontological manner. This can be useful for 
psychologists, not least because a concern with liminality leads us to think about the 
nature of actual occasions of experience, and, indeed, about the different ways in 
which experiences can be occasioned, especially the notion of liminal experience. The 
advantage of an ontological concept of liminality is that it promises relevance beyond 
the anthropological situation of human experience, and lodges the notion of ‘liminal 
experience’ within a broader processual account of nature and the cosmos. In 
broadening the concept beyond anthropology, it should nevertheless accommodate the 
anthropological use in which the occasions of experience in question are occasioned 
by forms of social and cultural activity mediated by communication (and 
presupposing more or less conscious human actors). All kinds of psychological 
phenomena can then be illuminated as experiences of liminality.   
Whitehead’s philosophy as a philosophy of limitation 
It must be remembered that Whitehead is a metaphysician and so deploys terms in 
unfamiliar ways that are maximally general. Liminality is not in fact a term that he 
uses, but he does describe his philosophy as a philosophy of limitation: ‘I use the term 
“limitation” for the most general conception of finitude’ (Whitehead (1922, p.16). 
This is because, for Whitehead, finitude in its most general sense is a species of 
limitation. From its partial perspective, each and every finite actual occasion that 
‘happens’ in the universe implicates the whole of reality within itself such that ‘each 
event signifies the whole structure’ (Whitehead, 1922, p.26). This means that no event 
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is inherently isolated, and yet each event is what it is (as a finite entity) on account of 
its limits.  
The concept of finitude implies that of infinity, and hence something finite is a 
limitation with respect to the infinite. Instead of infinity (and, indeed, the related but 
distinct concept of ‘totality’), Whitehead prefers the word factuality to express the 
inexhaustibleness of all that is and all that is becoming in the universe. If factuality is 
unlimited, then any given ‘factor’ we encounter can be grasped as a limitation of 
factuality. A factor qua limitation is something carved out of factuality or canalized 
within factuality. Importantly, this means that ‘limitation’ is not just a negative 
concept, but has positive content. A living organism, or a conscious experience, is a 
limited factor within factuality in the sense that it is a specific canalization of the 
wider physical universe. This is what allows Whitehead to ‘get rid of the notion of 
consciousness as a little box with some things inside it’ (Whitehead, 1922, p.17). A 
philosophy of limitations thus escapes the bifurcation into inner and outer that has 
plagued psychology since its inception: ‘the abstract is a limitation within the 
concrete, the entity is a limitation within totality, the factor is a limitation within fact’ 
(Whitehead, 1922, p.16).  
This perspective abolishes any notion of nature as an aggregate of self-contained 
entities, each isolatable from, and independent of, the others, and hence each ‘event 
signifies the whole structure’ (Whitehead, 1922, p.26). This is why the notion of an 
isolated event (a simple occurrence in a simple location) is a contradiction in terms. 
Any finite entity is part of a broader factuality, but it can participate more fully in that 
factuality, and perhaps even grasp the nature of its participation, only by overstepping 
the limits that made it what it was. Limitation, for Whitehead, never refers to a fixed 
boundary, but to something more like a threshold of transformation. Whitehead 
(1929, p.327) is clear, for example, that the first meaning of the word ‘process’ is the 
‘expansion of the universe with respect to actual things’. The basic atoms of the 
universe (the ‘actual entities’ or ‘actual occasions’) are not unchanging substances but 
fluences that emerge as concrete only through their own internal process of 
concrescence, through which ‘prehensions’ they selectively feel the broader factuality 
of the universe to which their concrescence contributes.  
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A philosophy of limitation might thus be said to consider each and every entity as 
situated ‘betwixt and between’ a finite limit and limitless infinity. It is in this sense 
that a concept of liminality shows itself as a transformation of the limits that form any 
given factor in the universe. Liminality is the passage from finite form to finite form, 
but in this passage between forms of finitude an entity is also exposed to the formless 
infinity beyond itself. We might say, to shift vocabulary, that the pristine individuated 
forms proper to Apollo thus encounter Dionysian transformation. Whitehead’s 
philosophy of limitation is thus revealed as a liminal philosophy since it is less 
concerned with the finite forms as such than with their transformation, the passage of 
their movements and their relations to the infinite totality. The ontological scope of 
this mode of thought makes it applicable even to molecules, although molecules - 
whose capacity for transformation is relatively trivial - remain incapable of 
punctuating their limit-crossing passages with ritual: 
Consider one definite molecule. It is part of nature. It has moved about for 
millions of years. Perhaps it started from a distant nebula. It enters the body; it 
may be as a factor in some edible vegetable; or it passes into the lungs as part 
of the air. At what exact point as it enters the mouth, or as it is absorbed 
through the skin, is it part of the body? At what exact moment, later on, does it 
cease to be part of the body? Exactness is out of the question. It is only to be 
obtained by some trivial convention. (Whitehead, 1938, p. 21) 
When dealing with the ‘betwixt and between’ of such molecular occasions of passage, 
exactness is out of the question. In the following quotation, which deals with the 
anthropological level, however, Whitehead shows himself to be particularly interested 
in those more ‘dramatic’ liminal occasions during which forms of process go through 
rapid and profound transformations, because the usual limits are swept away: 
Nothing is more interesting to watch than the emotional disturbance produced 
by any unusual disturbance of the forms of process. The slow drift is accepted. 
But when for human experience quick changes arrive, human nature passes 
into hysteria. For example, gales, thunderstorms, earthquakes, revolutions in 
social habits, violent illnesses, destructive fires, battles, are all occasions of 
special excitement. There are perfectly good reasons for this energetic reaction 
to quick change. My point is the exhibition of our emotional reactions to the 
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dominance of lawful order, and to the breakdown of such order. When 
fundamental change arrives, sometimes heaven dawns, sometimes hell yawns 
open (Whitehead, 1938, p. 95). 
Anthropological liminality 
It was Victor Turner who first proposed an approach called process anthropology , 
also called the anthropology of experience (Turner and Bruner, 1986). There is no 
evidence that he was directly influenced by Whitehead’s philosophy, and I suspect 
that he did not have a significant reading experience of Whitehead. The obvious 
inspirations within his process approach are Dilthey, Dewey and Schutz, and in his 
essay Process, system, and symbol: a new anthropological synthesis he also discusses 
Sally Faulk Moore’s legal anthropology of process (Turner, 1977). Both Schutz and 
Moore certainly were influenced by Whitehead, and so it is possible that Turner 
absorbed Whitehead only indirectly.  
Regardless of the nature of the influence, Turner articulated a process approach to 
anthropology that is in many ways very consistent with the philosophy of organism. 
He wrote of an intellectual shift ‘from a stress on concepts such as structure, 
equilibrium, function, system to process, indeterminacy, reflexivity – from a being to 
a becoming vocabulary’ (Turner, 1977, p.61). Turner nevertheless reminded his 
readers that: ‘It has sometimes been forgotten by those caught up in the first 
enthusiasm for processualism that process is intimately bound up with structure and 
that an adequate analysis of social life necessitates a rigorous consideration of the 
relation between them’ (Turner, 1977, p.65). 
It was in this intellectual context – which complements a broadly Whiteheadian 
approach to psychosocial science grounded in concepts of process and relationality - 
that Turner made the concept of liminality famous. The term ‘liminality’ derives from 
the Latin word ‘limen’ meaning ‘threshold’ (Schwelle, seuil). The outer limits 
(Schranke, frontier, marge) of the Roman empire, for instance, were marked by 
fortifications known as ‘limes’. As Thomassen (2009) points out, there is thus a clear 
spatial meaning in which liminality refers to borderlands, thresholds or other in-
between spaces whether these be thresholds between rooms in a house, thresholds 
between houses in a street, zones between streets, borders between states, or even 
wider geographical areas. This spatial meaning makes the concept relevant to sciences 
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like geography and archaeology, as when Pryor (2004, p.173) describes the 
causewayed enclosures of prehistoric Britain in relation to the ‘special status of 
physical liminality’: burial areas are liminal with respect to living areas, for instance. 
Liminality entails much more than this observable spatial meaning of a border 
between states or a threshold between rooms. It also conveys the less tangible 
temporal sense of something that happens: an occurrence, event or phase. As 
Thomassen (2009) suggests, this temporal dimension is also remarkably fluid, varying 
from moments (the liminality of sudden events like earthquakes or road accidents) to 
periods (the liminality of a summer holiday or the French revolution) to entire epochs 
(the ‘axial age’ or the Renaissance). The concept of the liminal did not begin with 
Turner, and nor did the idea of a processual anthropology. Turner discovered both in 
the anthropology of Arnold van Gennep who introduced the liminal in his book ‘Rites 
of passage’ from 1909. It is telling that Turner (1977, p.66) referred to van Gennep as 
‘the first scholar who perceived that the processual form of ritual epitomized the 
general experience in traditional society that social life was a sequence of movements 
in space-time, involving a series of changes in pragmatic activity and a succession of 
transitions in state and status for individuals and culturally recognized groups and 
categories’.  
 
Van Gennep’s Rites de Passage 
 
Van Gennep (1909) first introduced the concept of rites of passage. He showed that 
they were pervasive throughout all the cultures that had been studied by 
anthropologists at the turn of the 20th Century, and are characterised by a specific 
pattern. Rites of passage are rituals or ceremonies associated with significant turning 
points in the life of a society and in the lives of individuals. Their purpose is 
transformative in that they function to prepare, enact and commemorate transitions 
from one state or status to another, or between one world of ‘pragmatic activity’ and 
another. Rites of passage are many and varied. For example, van Gennep first 
discusses what he calls the ‘territorial passage’ where the crossing of frontiers of 
various kinds is accompanied by ceremonial rites. He goes on to describe rites 
associated with pregnancy, childbirth and childhood, before discussing initiation rites, 
ceremonies of betrothal and marriage and funerals. These are not entirely distinct 
from territorial rites, since in many societies a change in state, status or social position 
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will be accompanied by a territorial change in dwelling place, and hence a literal 
territorial passage will also be involved. Other relevant ceremonies include those rites 
which ‘accompany and bring about the change of the year, the season, or the month’, 
and, as van Gennep points out, these are also related to notions of birth, death and 
rebirth.  
 
In sum, whether territorial rites, seasonal (or other temporal) rites, life stage rites, or 
rites associated with changes of office, rituals of passage mark circumstances of 
transformation or becoming. Van Gennep’s chief contribution was his identification 
of a three-fold pattern of the rites of passage. This pattern has three phases which he 
called pre-liminal, liminal and postliminal. Each is a necessary stage in a process of 
becoming or transformation:  
 
• First there are rites of separation in which the previous state or social position 
is, as it were, broken down. These ceremonies often involve symbols of 
cutting or incision, as when a boy is circumcised or hair is cut during the 
separation phase of an initiation rite. 
• Then there is a middle transition phase of passage, which might often involve 
a trial or test that must be successfully completed. The symbolism here is 
often of movement, as when a bride is carried across a threshold or an initiate 
must make a dangerous leap from a high structure.  
• The passage then ends with the rites of incorporation during which the new 
status, position or identity is established and recognized. Here a wedding ring 
or crown may symbolize the unity of a new bond, as might the tying of fabrics 
or the knotting of belts.  
Van Gennep used the word ‘liminal’ to refer to the middle, transitional phase of this 
pattern. What is distinctive about this middle phase is that during it the usual limits 
imposed by the rules and norms of social structure have been temporarily removed. 
This suspension of the usual order of things is symbolized by the preliminal rites of 
separation, but during the liminal phase, a new order has not yet been reinstated by 
the rites of incorporation. That is to say, the rules, norms and expectations that applied 
to the previous social identity or status have been broken down in the rites of 
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separation, but those appropriate to the new identity or status have not yet been 
established in the rites of incorporation. The participants thus find themselves 
exposed to, and sometimes put to the test within, a strangely unlimited situation. To 
use a phrase that Turner would make famous, they are ‘betwixt and between’.  
In Rites of Passage, then, van Gennep gives us an image of society, not just as a set of 
positions, structures, states and statuses, but also as a constant and shifting set of 
movements from one position, structure, state or status to another. This is the image 
of society summed up by the children’s rhyme about a man who went through all his 
rites of passage in one week: ‘Solomon Grundy: born on Monday, Christened on 
Tuesday, Married on Wednesday, Took ill on Thursday, Worse on Friday, Died on 
Saturday, Buried on Sunday. That is the end of Solomon Grundy’. ‘Life itself’, van 
Gennep writes,  ‘means to separate and be reunited, to change form and condition, to 
die and to be reborn. It is to act and to cease, to wait and rest, and then to begin acting 
again, but in a different way. And there are always new thresholds to cross: the 
thresholds of summer and winter, of a season or a year, of a month or a night; the 
thresholds of birth, adolescence, maturity, and old age; the threshold of death and that 
of the afterlife – for those who believe in it.’ (1909, p. 189-90).  
An important point that van Gennep makes is that the transformations at stake in rites 
of passage bring into play a relationship with the sacred in contrast to the profane, a 
relationship which is always relative: ‘Whoever passes through the various positions 
of a lifetime one day sees the sacred where before he has seen the profane, or vice 
versa. Such changes of condition do not occur without disturbing the life of society 
and the individual, and it is the function of rites of passage to reduce their harmful 
effects’ (van Gennep, 1909, p.13).  
 
Turner on liminality, anti-structure and communitas 
… ritual processes contain within themselves a liminal phase, which provides 
a stage (and I use this term advisedly) for unique structures of experience 
(Dilthey’s Erlebnis) in milieus detached from mundane life and characterized 
by the presence of ambiguous ideas, monstrous images, sacred symbols, 
ordeals, humiliations, esoteric and paradoxical instructions, the emergence of 
symbolic types represented by maskers and clowns, gender reversals, 
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anonymity, and many other processes which I have elsewhere described as 
“liminal”. The limen, or threshold, a term I borrowed from van Gennep’s 
second of three stages in rites of passage, is a no-man’s-land betwixt and 
between the structural past and the structural future as anticipated by the 
society’s normative control of biological development (Turner, 1986, p.41).  
Victor Turner’s development of van Gennep’s notion of liminality was clearly 
inspired by this dual image of society as composed, on the one hand, of relatively 
enduring structures, states and statuses, and, on the other hand, of the becomings or 
transitions that occur at the joints, interstices or cracks of structure, and through which 
those structures are renovated and, as it were, ‘peopled’. Turner was particularly 
struck by the recognition that liminal phases involve the temporary and ritual 
suspension of social structure. For him (e.g. Turner, 1969), van Gennep’s idea of a 
liminal situation points to a quite particular and peculiar situation in which the usual 
limits that apply to recognizable social identities, positions and offices - including 
rights and responsibilities – are temporarily removed. The suspension of these limits, 
when all goes well, is what allows those involved to ‘pass-through’ a transition to a 
new set of limits. So, for example, in liminal ceremonies a person who is soon-to-be a 
king may be treated like a servant, or males and females maybe treated 
indiscriminately, and so forth.  
Turner was concerned that most social scientists pay almost exclusive attention to 
social structure and that this focus ignores the vitally important contribution made to 
wider society by the formative experiences that occur during these liminal, 
transitional moments in which social structure is suspended. To mark the importance 
of liminality he used the phrase anti-structure, and indeed gave his 1969 book The 
Ritual Process the subtitle structure and anti-structure. This emphasis on anti-
structure does not denote a lingering ‘structuralism’ in Turner’s thought, since he was 
well aware of the immanent and processual nature of structure. Rather, it shows an 
awareness of the importance of those many circumstances of rupture, transition and 
uncertainty that are not reducible to repeatable patterns of order and without which 
the advent of genuine novelty would remain inexplicable. During a liminal passage, 
the ‘passengers’ are directly exposed to the transient nature of the social 
differentiations that make up the familiar subject positions of social structure. 
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Differences of status, of gender, of family rank and so forth are, for a short but intense 
time, de-differentiated into a relatively unstructured limbo.  
For Turner, then, liminal situations are not just important because they function to 
reduce the harmful effects of disturbance to social and individual routines. They are 
also important because they create the conditions for an experiential confrontation 
with what it means to be a human being outside of and beyond the limits of a 
structurally given social position or state. If the usual position or status that one 
occupies provides one, metaphorically speaking, with a pair of blinkers that limit 
one’s focus to better enable the fulfillment of one’s duties, then a liminal experience 
involves the temporary removal of those blinkers. Such moments or episodes of 
exposure tend to be highly affectively charged, and for Turner, they can be 
enormously valuable formative experiences. For this reason, liminal experiences can 
give rise, he suggests, to a ‘sentiment of humankindness’. They can help to generate a 
sense of equality and of the common purpose of the society taken as a whole, rather 
than as a collection of structural positions. Liminal ‘anti-structure’, in short, is for 
Turner the source of those experiences that allow people to recognize the generic 
human bonds that make social structure possible and sustainable. This insight of 
Turner’s is clearly a development of van Gennep’s observations (cited earlier) about 
the sacred. As Turner (1969, p. 97) puts it, ‘Something of the sacredness of that 
transient humility and modelessness goes over and tempers the pride of the incumbent 
of a higher position or office’. This gives liminal situations a decisively important 
psychosocial function, since in forming the character of individuals, they also serve to 
revitalise, rather than simply reproduce, social structure. Again in Turner’s words, 
through liminal experiences, people are temporarily released from social structure 
‘only to return to structure revitalized’ (1969, p. 129). 
Turner uses the word communitas to capture this combination of valuable features 
associated with liminality and missed by those who concern themselves only with 
structure. The relatively formless flux of a liminal transition is the stuff out of which 
structure is formed. As he puts it, liminality is a ‘realm of pure possibility where 
novel configurations of ideas and relations may arise’ (Turner, 1967, p. 97). What is 
decisive, however, is the dialectic involving the alternation and interweaving of 
liminal communitas and structure. Communitas emerges where structure is not. 
Without communitas social structure will become inflexible and corrupt. Without 
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social structure, communitas would be chaotic. We thus have an account of social 
order that juxtaposes two ‘alternating models of human inter-relatedness’. The first is 
structured, differentiated and hierarchical, and the second is a ‘relatively unstructured 
communion of equal individuals submitting to the authority of the elders.’  
To rapidly summarise Turner’s dense arguments, we could say that liminality is a) 
about ‘event’ or transition rather than ‘structure’; b) it is about residual potential that 
has not yet been captured and externalized in concrete social structure; c) as potential, 
it evokes a potency that can revitalize or disrupt existing structural arrangements; d) it 
is about the vivid immediacy of the now, with all of its spontaneity; e) it is pre-
personal to the extent that it cannot be reduced to existing social identities with their 
allocated rights and duties; f) it engenders a general sense of anonymous and shared 
participation in a broader unity; g) it allows a glimpse at the kind of generalized 
egalitarian social bond; h) it points towards an open future with no borders; and i) it is 
about community rather than society1.  
Ontological liminality 
I have noted that Van Gennep and Turner were anthropologists and not philosophers, 
and the concept of liminality they developed was designed to be applicable to human 
social existence. Nevertheless, we have seen that this special focus fits neatly in the 
broader context of Whiteheadian ontology. A key point of communality here is to be 
found in the concept of experience. In his book From Ritual to Theatre (1982), Turner 
offers an etymology of the word experience and points to its use of the Indo-European 
root ‘per-,’. Per- means to venture or to risk, and hence is also found in words like 
peril. Experience thus conjures the sense of a passing-through which is risky. 
Szakolczai’s (2009, p.148) observations about the relationship between liminality and 
experience in general also provide an important clue to an ontological account of 
                                                
1 That is to say, community, not as something that is, but as something that happens: ‘Community is 
the being no longer side by side (and, one might add, above and below) but with one another of a 
multitude of persons. And this multitude, though it moves towards one goal, yet experiences 
everywhere a turning to, a dynamic facing of, the others, a flowing from I to Thou. Community is 
where community happens’ (Martin Buber [1961], cited by Turner, [1969] 1995). 
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liminality2. To have ‘an experience’, he suggests, ‘means that once previous 
certainties are removed and one enters a delicate, uncertain, malleable state; 
something might happen to one that alters the very core of one’s being’. In other 
words, the concept of experience, thought in this way, is synonymous with the 
concept of liminality, since a liminal state is precisely a ‘delicate, uncertain, malleable 
state’. This definition of experience fits with the way Turner defines ‘an experience’ 
as distinct from ‘mere experience’ in his co-edited volume from 1986 The 
Anthropology of Experience (1986):  
Mere experience is simply the passive endurance and acceptance of events. An 
experience, like a rock in a Zen sand garden, stands out from the evenness of 
passing hours and years and forms what Dilthey called a ‘structure of 
experience.’ In other words, it does not have an arbitrary beginning and 
ending, cut out of the stream of chronological temporality, but has what 
Dewey called ‘an initiation and a consummation’ (Turner and Bruner, 1986: 
35). 
‘An experience’, then, is something that ‘stands out’ because it introduces a rupture in 
the fabric of ‘mere experience’. We might call ‘an experience’ an event, in the same 
way that historians talk about historical events as significant moments of 
transformation. Liminal rites, in Turner’s view, are valuable precisely because they 
enable and generate such experiences. If we juxtapose this insight with Whiteheadian 
process philosophy, we encounter an ontology in which experience (in the form of 
actual occasions of experience) as such is fundamental to all forms of reality.  
 
Like Turner, Whitehead insists upon a pulse or rhythm which he calls the ‘rhythm of 
the creative process’. This rhythm ‘swings from the publicity of many things to the 
individual privacy; and it swings back from the private individual to the publicity of 
the objectified individual’ (Whitehead, 1929, p. 151). Process thought, then, gives a 
fundamental role to the process of experience, but experience conceived as a liminal 
going through. In this respect, Whitehead distinguishes two related meanings of 
                                                
2 Szakolczai (2009) also points out that the famous “first word” of Greek philosophy, apeiron, is 
equivalent to the latin liminality in referring to in-between moments when conventional limits are 
removed.  
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process: concrescence and transition. The first is the process through which an actual 
occasion converts its merely real data into determinate actuality (the actual occasion, 
strictly speaking, is that ‘converting’). The second is the process whereby the new and 
concrete ‘particular existent’ that is created by concrescence is taken up in turn as 
new data for the constitution of the next actual occasion. These are, however, two 
sides of a single process which allows Whitehead to simultaneously conceptualise 
both the expansion of the universe towards the infinite (where the ‘infinite’ is 
immanent within experience, and not an external ‘goal’) and the actual finite nature of 
the universe-awaiting-expansion. 
As I put it earlier, Whitehead’s philosophy of limitation considers each and every 
entity as situated ‘betwixt and between’ a finite limit and limitless infinity. I stated 
that liminality is the passage from finite form to finite form, but also that this passage 
between forms of finitude exposes an entity to the formless infinity beyond itself. 
This was the basis for my ontological definition of liminality as a transformation of 
the limits that form any given factor in the universe. Turner’s notion of communitas, 
and van Gennep’s comments about the sacred, can be viewed in this light as precisely 
the exposure of a previously limited form to a de-differentiated factuality beyond 
those limits, and hence to the possibility of an experience precisely of those limits. In 
his last work, Modes of Thought Whitehead would characterize this same swinging 
rhythm in terms of a movement between experience and expression. In the course of 
an actual occasion of experience the expressed data of the world is prehended into a 
unity. The result is a new expression which can in turn be data for the next moment of 
experience which, upon its satisfaction, will itself yield an expression. Hence for 
Whitehead (1938, p.23) ‘Feeling… is the reception of expressions’ and ‘Expression is 
the diffusion, in the environment, of something initially entertained in the experience 
of the expressor’. 
 
Although he is talking about the more limited domain of anthropology, Turner 
endorses a similar position when he describes expressions as the ‘crystallized 
secretions of once living human experience’ (Turner, 1982, p.17). Again, he is here 
influenced by Dilthey for whom, as Turner puts it, ‘experience urges towards 
expression’ (p. 37). Whitehead’s focus is naturally much broader, since his concept of 
experience is designed to be applicable to any and every actual occasion of 
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experience. The actual occasion is the atomic unit in Whitehead’s philosophy, 
meaning that all reality is ultimately composed, not of brute matter, but of occasions 
in which the potentialities of the world are recurrently actualised. Actual occasions 
are the experiences which give rise, through their infinite iterations, to the patterned 
expressions of the external world. Actual occasions of experience are thus events of 
transition from actuality to actuality. Structural patterns are the result of multiple, 
various and recurrent events of patterning (actual occasions of experience) in the 
course of which the ‘data’ of the world are lent pattern through a process of feeling. 
Feeling is not just an accompanying ‘quality’ but literally a process of grasping 
(positive prehension) whereby an actual occasion/entity patterns the heterogeneous 
data of its actual world into a unity (including what is not felt since it is ‘negatively 
prehended’). As Whitehead (1929, p.41) puts it:  
 
Each actual entity is conceived as an act of experience arising out of data. It is 
a process of ‘feeling’ the many data… Here ‘feeling’ is the term used for the 
basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the 
subjectivity of the actual entity in question. Feelings… effect… a transition 
into subjectivity.   
Feelings – as ‘vectors’ or transitions effecting concrescences - are thus liminal in the 
sense that they concern movement across a threshold from objectivity to subjectivity 
and back again. Whitehead puts this most clearly when he describes feelings as 
‘vectors’ since ‘they feel what is there and transform it to what is here.’ These 
feelings, however, are intensive, subjective, transitive affairs, which can be 
experienced by others only once they have actualised into concrete expressions, and 
hence become part of the data of the universe (only once they have, in short, 
perished). The inert facts of structure, like bones and teeth, are simultaneously the 
dead products of previously living immediacies of becoming, and the data that make 
possible the living events of the now.  
In sum, there is a direct parallel to be drawn between the state/status/position ! 
transition ! state/status/position pattern of anthropological liminality, and the public 
expression (datum) ! private experience (subjective transition) ! public expression 
pattern of a Whiteheadian version of ontological liminality. The pre-liminal, liminal 
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and post-liminal pattern of separation ! transition ! incorporation thus shows up as 
an anthropological echo of Whitehead’s ontological trio of perishing ! transition ! 
concrescence, and both concern a certain ‘objective immortality’ whereby what is 
dead, and hence divested of its own becoming, is appropriated as a component in the 
vital immediacies of the living. 
Conclusion: artists in ritual 
For convenience we can distinguish three broad ways in which liminality becomes 
relevant as an ontological concept within process thought. The first way concerns 
relationality. For Whitehead, things are relational in that they are ultimately defined 
by their relevance to other things, and by the way other things are relevant to them. 
This gives a decisive importance to relations ‘betwixt and between’ spatial things, or 
spatial liminality (something liminal is both x and y).  
The second way concerns temporality. For Whitehead, things are constituted in and 
by their temporal relationship to a past that is giving rise to a future. From a process 
perspective, all things perish and recur (Brown, 2012, p.31), and all of nature is 
understood as a rhythm of arising, perishing and replacement. This gives a decisive 
importance to relations ‘betwixt and between’ times, or temporal liminality 
(something liminal is both no longer and not yet).  
The third way, which is a combination of both, is that process thought emphasises 
creativity and emergence. Thought and experience can never be understood merely as 
representations or reflections of a pre-existing reality, since at stake is the emergence 
of new forms of reality. Process concerns the emergence of novelty: the ‘expansion of 
the universe with respect to actual things is the first meaning of “process”’. This 
expansion occurs through the process of concresence during which a ‘particular 
existent’ is constituted in the fluency of an actual occasion. By way of an actual 
occasion of experience, something new is added to the data that are patterned into a 
unity, since what is added that was missing before is precisely this element of pattern: 
‘[T]he many become one and are increased by one’ (Whitehead, 1929, p. 21).  
It is now possible to see the extent to which Whitehead’s philosophy is replete with 
liminal themes. He recurrently draws attention to the mixed, mediating spaces and 
times between phenomena. His key concepts tend to encourage paradoxical ‘both / 
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and’ thinking rather than discrete ‘either / or’ thinking. The concept of the actual 
occasion, for example, is both subject and object since it is defined in relation to a 
subject concerning itself with its objects and in so doing, creating itself and 
objectifying itself in the expression of a superject. In the same way, where many 
styles of thought would oppose teleological and efficient modes of causation, 
Whitehead crafts the concept of the actual occasion precisely to combine teleology 
with efficient causation: futural subjective aim and brute fact from the past are fused 
in a liminal present of becoming. The concept of the bifurcation of nature likewise 
warns against the separation of subject from object, and encourages liminal modes of 
thought.   
A liminal philosophy of becoming like Whitehead’s can accept no absolute divisions 
between human and animal, conscious and unconscious, living and non-living, 
internal and external since the starting point is an immanent unity of nature composed 
of a multiplicity of experiences/expressions. This is why Whitehead blurs distinctions 
as soon as he makes them, drawing attention to the exceptions and to the impossibility 
of ultimate clarity. The human body is ultimately indistinguishable from its physical 
environment. It is ‘that region of the world which is the primary field of human 
expression’ (Whitehead, 1938, p. 22). At the same time, our bodies are liminal in that 
they ‘lie beyond our own individual experience… and yet are part of it’ (1938, p. 21). 
Life is ultimately indistinguishable from non-living regions of nature, although 
‘Where ever there is a region of nature which is itself the primary field of the 
expressions issuing from each of its parts, that region is alive’. ‘Life’, writes 
Whitehead, ‘lurks in the interstices of each living cell, and in the interstices of the 
brain’ (Whitehead, 1929, p. 105-6). Or again, it is ‘a characteristic of “empty space” 
and not of space “occupied” by any corpuscular society’ (1929, p. 105). If something 
lives, then that means it is forever managing the permanent liminality of its own 
constant break down.  
If humankind became artists in ritual, then this is because ritual provided a means to 
grasp and collectively transfigure this constant break down that is life, and to find in 
that transfiguration the means for a rejuvenated future: ultimately, to be reborn from 
death. The ritual madness of Dionysiac rites is a matter of finding rapture in the 
rupture of death and rebirth just as the wine of which he is also the deity is born from 
the crushed grape.  If art in the form of tragedy was truly born from the matrix of 
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Dionysiac ritual, then this is because such revels permitted the reveler - transformed 
into a satyr – to see ‘a new vision outside himself’ (Nietzsche, 2003, p.43). This close 
encounter with ones own limits affords a view – no matter how blurred - from 
beyond. Wrapped in the bitter-sweet beauty of tragedy, the weight of life’s torments is 
carried aloft on the wings of art.   
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